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I
INTRODUCTION
Past research on the nature and scope of medical-malpractice claims in
Florida has found that a very high number of cases are resolved before trial,
and, conversely, a very low number of cases are resolved through jury trials. A
general survey of the process of medical-malpractice claims resolution in
Florida between 1990 and 2003 reveals that 45% of claims resulted in payments,
46% of paid claims were closed in three years, and 96% were closed in six
years.1 Moreover, 20% of paid claims were settled without a lawsuit ever being
filed, and only 2.3% of paid claims were resolved following a jury trial. Out of
all awards equal to or exceeding one million dollars, approximately 10% were
made without a plaintiff ever filing a formal lawsuit, compared to less than 5%
of cases resolved through jury trial.2
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1. See Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 329–30 (2005) [hereinafter Vidmar et al., Uncovering].
2. Neil Vidmar et al., Million Dollar Medical Malpractice Cases in Florida: Post-verdict and Presuit Settlements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2006) [hereinafter Vidmar et al., Million Dollar].
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Numerous researchers have studied when parties in a legal dispute go to
trial and when they settle out of court.3 These investigations—which often use
the Pareto notion of equality4 tested with game-theoretic models—have focused
on the strategic decision-making elements of pretrial settlements. These studies
have found that each party’s level of information, as well as the rules of the
game, affect the likelihood of settlement.5 The few studies that have used real
data to examine settlement rates have found very high pretrial-settlement rates.6
The dynamics behind these resolution rates—whether they are milliondollar cases, lesser awards, or claims without awards—should be considered in
the context of the discovery and procedural rules guiding the claiming process.
A study of closed-claim files of major medical-liability insurers clearly
demonstrates the importance of the discovery process in resolving claims.7
Before claims can be settled, both parties need to uncover the facts bearing on
the dispute, including both the determination of causality and the presence of
legal negligence. Today, a patient in a hospital is often treated by multiple
specialists, resident physicians, nurses, and technicians. At the beginning of a
claim, no one may know if, which, and how many of these persons might have
been negligent.8 The formal process of discovery can be difficult and timeconsuming, and undoubtedly is a primary cause of delay in the settlement of
most disputes.

3. See, e.g., Richard Howard, Richard Chard, Joel Kaji & Jeffrey Davis, Pre-trial Bargaining and
Litigation: The Search for Fairness and Efficiency, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 431, 434 (2000) (discussing
literature and models about settlement).
4. A social condition is pareto-optimal or pareto-efficient when it is not possible to shift to
another condition judged better by at least one person and worse by none. AMARTYA SEN,
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 21 (1970).
5. See Alison Watts, Bargaining Through an Expert Attorney, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 168, 169
(1994); Janusz Ordover & Ariel Rubinstein, A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric
Information, 101 Q.J. ECON. 879, 880 (1986); Stephen Salant, Litigation of Settlement Demands
Questioned by Bayesian Defendants 1 (Cal. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper, 1984); see also Ben
DePoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Precedent Effect of Settlement, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
957, 987 (2010) (discussing informal networking among lawyers regarding the “going rates” of private
settlements and their use in private negotiations); Howard et al., supra note 3, at 433 (discussing the
role of fairness in settlements).
6. Vidmar et al., Uncovering, supra note 1, at 355; Vidmar et al., Million Dollar, supra note 2, at
1345. This finding is also consistent with the disappearing-trial phenomenon, which has found that the
rate of trials for civil cases is approaching zero. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials
Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of
Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 705 (2004) (finding that the rate of settlement
has declined, but that the rate of nontrial adjudication has increased, which is consistent with some of
the pretrial mechanisms presented in this research); see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Disappearing Trials?
A Comparative Perspective, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 735, 736, (2004); Allan Kanner & M. Ryan
Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 299 (2006); Marc Galanter, A
World Without Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 21 (2007); Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica Bina,
Puzzles About Supply-Side Explanations for Vanishing Trials: A New Look at Fundamentals, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 645–46 (2004).
7. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 28–29 (1995).
8. Id.
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A study of North Carolina closed-claim files found that the informationgathering process often resulted in changes in the insurers’ evaluations of the
cases.9 For instance, an initial defense expert might say there was no negligence;
but after consulting with other experts, the defense lawyer and liability insurer
might decide negligence had occurred. Indeed, the variation among experts
about the presence of negligence is one of the causes of litigation itself.10
Deposing the plaintiff’s experts might change the insurer’s evaluation of the
claim’s merit still again. Despite claims about “nuisance settlements,” insurers
are reluctant to settle cases unless there is substantial evidence of legal
negligence on the part of the insured.11 Similarly, the results of the discovery
process often cause plaintiffs to abandon claims when they conclude that
negligence cannot be proven or, in any event, that the costs of litigation would
offset any potential recovery.
In short, this article contributes to the topic of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) by drawing attention to the frequent and complicated evidentiary
problems in medical malpractice claims and the procedural mechanisms
provided by statutes, court rules, and case law that are already in place to
facilitate claim resolution. Other states have procedural mechanisms similar to
those in Florida. As such, while proposed ADR procedures might well provide
better resolutions to medical malpractice claims, they must take into
consideration both the unique characteristics of medical malpractice disputes
and existing mechanisms for resolving these disputes.
II
REGULATION OF ADR IN FLORIDA
In at least one sense, the nature of medical-malpractice claims makes them
particularly suitable for ADR. The patient–provider relationship is not based
on a traditional economic exchange.12 The deliberative nature of many ADR
practices can benefit both the provider—who is able to avoid the pitfalls of
engagement in a court battle—and the patient, who is seeking a resolution to a
breach of confidence.13 Previous research on the general pretrial process in

9. Id.
10. Id. at 23–35, 59–82; see also Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient
Interests, the Contingency Fee System, Juries, and Social Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (2005).
11. See Lance McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement “Problem”: The Elusive Truth and a Clarifying
Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 221, 228 (2007).
12. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, The Professional Ethics of Billing and Collections, 300 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 1806, 1806 (2008) (“In a relational model, medical service is embedded in a
therapeutic relationship in which physicians have personal and moral ties to patients that make
maximizing profits inappropriate.”); Allen K. Hutkin, Resolving the Medical Malpractice Crisis:
Alternatives to Litigation, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 21, 26–29 (1989–1990) (discussing the unique aspects of the
physician–patient relationship).
13. See John Cooley, A Dose of ADR for the Health Care Industry, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr.
2002, at 16, 20 (stating “[c]o-mediation has repeatedly produced win–win solutions”); Roderick B.
Mathews, The Role of ADR in Managed Health Care Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1999, at 8, 11
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medical-malpractice cases, and Florida cases in particular, however, suggests a
need for further investigation into the types of claims that are resolved, both
outside the formal litigation system and during pretrial processes following a
lawsuit.
The research presented in this article leaves the discussions of efficiency,
fairness, and legality to others. Instead, it focuses on building a profile of the
types of cases that are resolved at each pretrial stage of the claiming process.
Creating a quantitative profile of each step between incident and court
demonstrates the effectiveness of a regulatory framework governing the course
of claims before trial and the consequent opportunities for settlement. The
profile also reveals the timeline for claim resolution, the payments involved at
each stage, and the extent to which medical-malpractice claims and resolution
change over time. Particular attention is paid to the resolution of large-payment
cases.
To start this discussion, it is important to understand that the course of a
medical-malpractice claim is guided by statutory regulations. Figure 1 displays a
timeline for a claim resulting in adjudication, from incident to appeal.14

90-day
waiting
period

Arbitration

Appellate Verdict

Verdict

Mandatory
Settlement
Conference

Mediation

Filing

Notification
of Claim

Incident

Figure 1: Timeline for a Medical-Malpractice Claim in Florida

Trial

Appeal

Time

(1999) (describing the advantages of ADR including privacy, confidentiality, and avoiding the win-orlose confrontation of the courtroom).
14. The timeline presented here is specific to the process in Florida. For a simplified timeline, see
Thomas Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical Malpractice, 9 ALASKA L. REV.
429, 430 (1992).
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Florida, like many other states,15 constrains the claiming process through a
number of statutory guidelines. By statute, a plaintiff may not file a lawsuit for a
period of ninety days after notifying the defendant of the medical malpractice
claim.16 During this ninety-day period, the defendant must conduct a review of
the incident in question.17 After this internal review, the defendant can reject
the claim, make a settlement offer, or move that the claim be handled through
arbitration.18 During the pre-suit period, both the plaintiff and defendant may
engage in informal discovery; but any information obtained in this informal
stage is inadmissible if a lawsuit is filed.19 All medical-malpractice claims must
be bound to a mediation process within 120 days after a lawsuit is filed.20 In
addition, claims can be submitted for arbitration for the sole determination of
damages if the defendant concedes fault.21 These procedural rules, of course, are
intended to promote discussion and foster a resolution of the claim. There are
additional rules and practices that apply if the claim is not resolved through
mediation, including settlement conferences with the judge who is assigned to

15. Many states have statutory requirements for the pretrial process for general grievances and
medical-malpractice claims. See, e.g., Richard H. Steen, NEW JERSEY: Med-Mal Reform Addresses
ADR, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.–Oct. 2004, at 6, 6–7; Kelly Meadows, Note, Resolving Medical Malpractice
Disputes in Massachusetts: Statutory and Judicial Initiatives in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 4
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 165, 172–75 (1999); Michael E. Weinzierl, Wisconsin’s New CourtOrdered ADR Law: Why It Is Needed and Its Potential for Success, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 583, 591 (1995).
Michigan requires mediation. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.4903 (2000). Minnesota has general
requirements for ADR, not just aimed at medical malpractice. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2010). Montana
medical-malpractice claims are subject to mandatory settlement conference conducted by a panel of
senior judges. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-105, 27-6-701 (2009). New Jersey requires the use of an
arbitrator if the amount of the claim is $20,000 or less. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-20 (West 2010).
Other states, such as New York, New Mexico, Ohio, and Pennsylvania allow parties to engage in
arbitration, but do not require it.
16. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (2010).
17. Florida requires that the review be conducted by either (1) a duly qualified claims adjuster; (2)
a panel comprised of a malpractice attorney, a healthcare provider trained in the same or similar
medical specialty as the prospective defendant, and a duly-qualified claims adjuster; (3) a medicalreview committee of a society of healthcare providers; or (4) any similar procedure that fairly and
promptly evaluates the pending claim. Id. § 766.106(3)(a). In addition, Section 766.106(4) requires that
insurers must investigate all claims with the cooperation of both parties. The investigation may include
a screening panel. No civil liability will arise from participation in the pretrial screening “if done
without intentional fraud.”
18. Id. § 766.106(4)(b). The Florida law adds to the growing practice in healthcare of requiring
patients to sign binding arbitration agreements when they receive care. See, e.g., Ann Krasuski,
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Do Not Belong in Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 263, 264 (2004); Kenneth A. DeVille, The Jury Is Out: Pre-dispute
Binding Arbitration Agreements for Medical Malpractice Claims, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 333 (2007);
Sandra Benson, Pre-injury Agreements To Arbitrate Health Care Disputes: Legally “Shocking” or
Legally Sensible, 11 J. LEGAL ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 59, 59 (2008). Courts frequently address the
legality of these agreements. See, e.g., Owens v. Nat’l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 867, 879 (Tenn. 2007);
Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So.2d 661, 663 (Ala. 2004); Hogan v. Country Villa
Health Servs., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 450, 453–55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Garrison v. Super. Ct. of L.A.
Cnty., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)).
19. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(5) (2010).
20. Id. § 766.108(1).
21. Id. § 766.106(3)(b)(3).
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the case. All of these rules are intended to promote discussion and settlement
without trial. Moreover, as described below, by statute, Florida physicians can
opt to practice without liability insurance coverage; and a substantial number of
physicians have chosen to do so. This factor too can affect the settlement
process. With this preliminary overview of the legal guidelines and processes,
research on the Florida closed-claim database is presented.
III
METHOD AND DATA
The principal source of these data is the Florida Medical Malpractice Closed
Claim Report obtained from the Florida Department of Financial Services.22
Florida law requires professional-liability insurers and self-insurers to report
detailed information relating to every medical-malpractice claim, regardless of
whether it results in payment to the claimant.23 Each claim is coded for up to
seventy-six variables,24 including when and where the incident occurred, the
date the claim was filed, the seriousness of the most severe alleged injury,
whether a lawsuit resulted, the date of the lawsuit, how and when the lawsuit
was resolved, the amount of indemnity paid (if any), and the defense-litigation
costs. The database also includes brief, prose summaries of the nature of the
injury, which provide a basis for qualitative analyses to supplement the
quantitative analyses.
There are several important and unique characteristics of medical practice
in Florida that bear upon interpretations of the database. As discussed, Florida
is the only state that allows healthcare providers to practice without liabilityinsurance coverage as long as they sign a nonrevocable letter of credit to cover
medical-negligence injuries up to $250,000.25 In 2003, approximately 600 doctors
chose this option.26 By 2008, reports indicate that as many as 5,200 doctors had

22. Doctor/Lawyer Malpractice Tracking System, FLA. OFFICE OF INS. REGULATION, http://
www.floir.com/Liability/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Tracking System]. The Florida Closed
Claims database contains brief summary accounts of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the actions
of the defendant(s), the nature of the misdiagnosis (if one allegedly occurred), and the remedial actions
undertaken by the defendant(s). After cleaning and organizing the data, the descriptions of injuries
were run through a qualitative analysis program (Atlas.ti) to determine common patterns of injuries
and actions. After groupings of the data were determined, the descriptions were read through by the
authors and common problems, occurrences, and issues were identified. Although the full descriptions
are available online from the state of Florida, human subjects protocol dictates that the authors provide
the information from these claims in a manner that assures the confidentiality of both the plaintiff and
the defendant. As the names of the parties could be extrapolated from the Florida database using
newspaper reports or court documents, the full details of each claim are not provided.
23. FLA. STAT. § 627.912(1)(a), (5) (2010).
24. See id. § 627.912(1)(c) (detailing reporting requirements).
25. Id. § 627.912(1)(a), (5).
26. Vidmar et al., Uncovering, supra note 1, at 325.
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chosen the no-liability-insurance option.27 Claims against these doctors must still
be reported to the Florida Department of Insurance, but there is no systematic
policing of compliance.28
This has two implications. The obvious methodological implication is that
some claims may not be reported in the files. The substantive implication is that
the failure to carry liability insurance may discourage claims because plaintiffs’
lawyers may be discouraged from filing lawsuits on the grounds that a $250,000
limit on their litigation costs will offset any recovery.29
Although the dataset extends back to 1975, the analyses are limited to
claims closed from the year 1990 forward through 2008.30 Caution must be used
in interpreting the final three years of the dataset, because previous research
has shown that, after a lawsuit is filed, the average time to closing the file is 3.39
years, with an average standard deviation of 1.96 years.31 Consequently,
although the 2006 through 2009 data capture information on claims closed
during this period, many claims first filed between 2005 and 2008 would not yet
have been resolved. The result is an incomplete profile of claims during the last
years covered in this study. The later years are included in the analyses but
should be treated with caution.
IV
A GENERAL PROFILE OF MEDICAL-MALPRACTICE CLOSED-CLAIMS IN
FLORIDA
A. The Total Number of Medical-Malpractice Claims
The number of medical malpractice claims (as measured in incidents, claims,
or dispositions) reveals important trends in filing and resolution. Table 1
demonstrates that between 1990 and 1998, the population-adjusted number of
incidents averaged 1,765 paid claims per year. Beginning in 1999, the numbers
jumped substantially to an average of 2,635 paid claims per year. There was, on
27. Bob LaMendola, Uninsured Doctors on the Rise in South Florida, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July
27, 2008, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2008-07-27/news/0807260139_1_malpracticeinsurance-medical-malpractice-doctors.
28. See William Monroe, Auditor General, Office of Ins. Regulation Closed Claim Database,
Report No. 2005–31 Operational Audit 1 (2004) (noting inaccuracies in the database). The reported
pain-and-suffering components of jury verdicts and settlements are especially prone to error.
29. The Florida statute requires all health professionals to report claims and thus the database
includes claims against dentists, podiatrists, chiropractors, and independent nurses. FLA. STAT. §
627.912(5) (2010). Because the concern about a medical-malpractice crisis was centered on physicians,
those claims involving nonphysician professionals are eliminated from the analyses.
30. The analyses are limited to recent years to focus on the modern approach to the resolution of
medical-malpractice claims. In addition, many of the regulatory requirements for pretrial actions in
medical-malpractice claims were initiated in the 1980s. Analyses after this period allow for a clear
understanding of the effects of pretrial-resolution methods.
31. The mean closing times and standard deviations are approximately the same from 1990 through
2004. The mean disposition time between 2005 and 2008 increased to an average of 3.78 years. The
authors offer no explanation at this time for this change.
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average, a lag of 1.25 years between the occurrence of a negative outcome and
the reporting of a claim, a lag of 2.05 years until the filing of a lawsuit, and a lag
of 3.26 years until the disposition of the claim. Thus, beginning in about 2001,
the number of lawsuits increased between 1990 and 2009. Finally, beginning in
about 2004, the number of paid claims began to rise.
Table 1: Paid Claims by Incident, Suit, and Disposition Date

Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Florida
Population
13,033,307
13,369,798
13,650,553
13,927,185
14,239,444
14,537,875
14,853,360
15,186,304
15,486,559
15,759,421
16,049,316
16,348,628
16,667,906
16,959,251
17,342,623
17,736,027
18,057,508
18,251,243
18,328,340
18,537,969

Incidents
1,349
1,549
1,568
1,623
1,681
1,771
1,721
1,716
1,786
2,194
2,641
2,706
2,428
1,949
1,524
1,125
836
473
215
25

Suits
855
892
1,108
1,106
1,243
1,278
1,333
1,195
1,244
1,177
1,320
1,817
2,194
2,171
1,838
1,182
1,108
802
453
146

Dispositions
1,342
1,319
1,172
1,231
1,390
1,725
1,988
1,787
1,676
1,378
1,481
1,520
1,627
2,087
2,954
2,646
2,346
2,068
1,990
1,659

Incidents
(per
100,000)
10.35
11.59
11.49
11.65
11.81
12.18
11.59
11.30
11.53
13.92
16.46
16.55
14.57
11.49
8.79
6.34
4.63
2.59
1.17
0.13

Suits
(per
100,000)
6.56
6.67
8.12
7.94
8.73
8.79
8.97
7.87
8.03
7.47
8.22
11.11
13.16
12.80
10.60
6.66
6.14
4.39
2.47
0.79

Dispositions
(per 100,000)
10.30
9.87
8.59
8.84
9.76
11.87
13.38
11.77
10.82
8.74
9.23
9.30
9.76
12.31
17.03
14.92
12.99
11.33
10.86
8.95

The shaded cells in Table 1 indicate data on the number of occurrences and
suits that must be treated cautiously because some claims from those years
might still be working their way through the system.
Although columns three through five of Table 1 report raw numbers, they
do not reflect changes in Florida’s population. In 1990, the population was
13,033,307; it grew steadily to 18,328,340 in 2008, an increase of 28.9%, or an
average population increase of 1.5% each year.32 The growth in population,
especially with a trend toward an older population,33 increases the chances of
32. Population data from American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=datasets_1&_lan
g=en&_ts= (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
33. The median age in Florida is 40.2 years, which is almost four years older than the median
population in the United States (36.8 years). Population data from ACS Demographic and Housing
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serious illnesses and negative outcomes during medical treatment. To account
for the possible increase in patients and medical care, Table 1 also reports the
dates of the alleged malpractice occurrence, the year a lawsuit was filed, and the
paid claims for each year adjusted for population.34
Figure 2 presents the above data in graphic form, although it stops at 2006
because claims made after 2004 or 2005 are not expected to be resolved yet due
to the lag time between occurrence and resolution. The lag in time between
occurrence and suit and between occurrence and disposition can be seen in the
peak years of each of these elements in the graph.
Figure 2: Paid Claims Adjusted for Population Growth

B. The Amount of Indemnity Paid
An item of consistent interest in medical-malpractice claims is the amount
paid to the plaintiff for medical, wage, legal, and other expenses. Table 2 gives
the breakdown of average and standard deviation amounts paid in each of these
categories.35

Estimates: 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/MYPTable?_bm=y&geo_id=04000US12&-qr_name=ACS_2008_1YR_G00_CP5_1&-ds_name=ACS_2008_1YR_G00_&_lang=en&-redoLog=false (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
34. Controlling for the population increase reveals patterns remarkably similar to the raw data.
Because the patterns are similar and the raw data are much easier to interpret, the remainder of this
paper will use the raw data.
35. All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2008 dollars to account for inflation.
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Table 2: Amounts Paid to Plaintiffs in Medical-Malpractice Claims

Amount Paid to Plaintiff by Primary Insurer
Medical Costs (Past and Future)
Wage Costs (Past and Future)
Other Costs (Past and Future)
Noneconomic Losses*
Loss-Adjustment Expense Paid to Defense Counsel
All Other Loss-Adjustment Expenses Paid
Amount Paid to Plaintiff by Primary Insurer (ONLY
PAID CLAIMS)

Number
of
Claims
66,246
66,334
66,334
66,334
66,334
32,056
32,056
20,685

Average
(USD)
129,620
58,061
19,864
22,161
72,619
42,245
12,170
302,476

Standard
Deviation
(USD)
559,007
1,022,354
263,084
2,103,564
1,174,270
1,043,080
95,018
907,041

As Table 2 shows, the average indemnity paid to the plaintiff is not an
extremely large amount, but is not dismissible either. The figure for
“noneconomic” losses has an asterisk because previous investigation of the
Florida closed-claim files has shown these figures to be unreliable and often
inflated by the liability insurer to downplay the plaintiff’s actual economic
losses.36 Examining only the paid claims, the average payment increased
dramatically to just over $300,000. Another element of interest is that 68.8% of
all claims were resolved without any payment.37
V
THE SEVERITY OF THE ALLEGED INJURY
The Florida law requires the insurer to rate the severity of the alleged injury
on the widely used nine-point scale originally developed by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).38 Table 3 reports, for each
year, the mean percentage of paid claims according to each severity level.39

36. See Vidmar et al., Uncovering, supra note 1, at 325–28 (discussing the limitations of the closedclaim files).
37. The number of claims paid is 20,685, which is 31.2% of 66,334. Therefore, 31.2% of claims were
paid. The group of claims resolved without payment should be distinguished from those claims that are
abandoned. Claims in the first group are resolved, but there is no payment.
38. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, INTRODUCTION: CLAIM REPORT FORM, 2 MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS: FINAL COMPILATION 2, 8 (M. Sowka ed., 1980). The scale is as follows:
Level
Type of Injury
Examples of Injury
1
Emotional Only
Fright, no physical damage
2
Temporary: Slight
Lacerations; contusions, minor scars, rash. No delay
3
Temporary: Minor
Infections, mis-set fracture, fall in hospital. Recovery delayed
4
Temporary: Major
Burns, surgical material left, drug side-effect, brain damage.
Recovery delayed
5
Permanent: Minor
Loss of fingers, loss or damage to organs. Includes nondisabling injuries
6
Permanent: Significant
Deafness, loss of limb, loss of eye, loss of one kidney or lung
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Table 3: Severity Level of Medical-Malpractice Claims
Severity
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Claims
3,178
3,614
10,654
6,192
8,353
6,571
3,443
2,558
16,932

Percent of
Total Claims
5%
6%
17%
10%
14%
11%
6%
4%
28%

Paid Claims
1,446
1,895
6,630
4,094
6,198
4,820
2,729
2,039
12,419

Percent of Claims
that Are Paid
46%
52%
62%
66%
74%
73%
79%
80%
73%

As Table 3 shows, the number of claims in each severity level varied
significantly, with the most common severity level being 9—which indicates the
patient died. In addition, those claims that ultimately ended in a payment to the
plaintiff also varied by severity level, ranging from 46% for level 1 claims to
80% for level 8 claims, with the more-severe injuries having higher payment
rates. As there are large variations between severity levels displayed in Table 3,
the examination of severity is continued in subsequent sections.
VI
STAGES OF RESOLUTION
Table 4 displays the stage of resolution for resolved claims. The majority of
claims are either dropped or abandoned (19%), resolved before a suit is filed
(16%), or resolved after the suit is filed but before trial (50%).

7
8

Permanent: Major
Permanent: Grave

Paraplegia, blindness, loss of two limbs, brain damage
Quadriplegia, severe brain damage, lifelong care or fatal
prognosis
9
Permanent
Death
The closed-claims database also includes a prose description of the injury.
39. A similar analysis was presented in Vidmar et al., Uncovering, supra note 1, at 349, but the data
presented in Table 3 are not precisely comparable because this article focuses only on physicians and
hospitals, eliminating all other healthcare providers.
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Table 4: Stages of Resolution
Stage
Claim or Suit Abandoned
During Arbitration
Before Pre-suit Period
Within 90 Days of Suit Being Filed
Pre-suit Period
Before or During Mandatory Settlement Conference
During Trial but Before Verdict
After Verdict but Before Filing of Appeal
After Notice of Appeal is Filed or Posted
During Appeal
After Appeal

Number
6,170
1,363
644
947
5,057
16,305
379
664
664
80
194

Percentage
19%
4%
2%
3%
16%
50%
1%
2%
2%
0%
1%

In other words, the vast majority of paid claims (94%) were resolved before
or during trial—that is, before a formal judgment by the court. Thus, much of
the remainder of this discussion will focus on how specific details of claims
affect the stage of resolution, broken down by claims resolved (1) through
arbitration, (2) before a suit, (3) during the pre-suit period, (4) after the suit is
filed but before trial, and (5) after a trial begins but before a verdict is rendered.
These claims are also compared to those resolved after a verdict.
VII
SUBPROFILES OF THE STAGES OF RESOLUTION
A. Claims Resolved Before the Pre-suit Period
As described earlier, a plaintiff may not file a suit for a period of ninety days
after notifying the defendant of the claim of medical malpractice.40 The data
show, however, that some claims are settled before the plaintiff officially
notifies the defendant of the claim. The claims resolved prior to the official
notification are resolved before the plaintiff officially contacts the defendant for
information regarding the claim. Although the number of these claims was not
substantial in terms of the overall percentage, as evidenced in Table 4, the
number has grown in recent years.41

40. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (2010).
41. Please note, again, that the most recent years’ data is unpredictable at best and should be
treated with caution.
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Figure 3: Claims Resolved Before the Pre-suit Period

Figure 3 shows that a small portion of claims (644 overall) were resolved
before the notification of a claim. Recall that the overall time from incident to
disposition for all claims averaged 3.25 years. In contrast, claims resolved before
the pre-suit period required an average of 1.5 years for disposition. In addition,
these claims were reported much more quickly. Although it took most claims
470 days (or 1.28 years) from incident to reporting, claims resolved before the
pre-suit period were reported in 208 days (or just over half a year). Claims
resolved before the pre-suit period had a lower average payment ($90,867) than
the overall average of $129,620. Resolving a claim at this stage, however,
resulted in a much-higher likelihood of payment to the plaintiff; ninety-four
percent of these claims resulted in a payment. As such, the average payout for
paid claims settled before the pre-suit period was also lower ($96,894) than the
overall average for paid claims ($302,476). The data presented in Figure 3
combined with the data on average payments suggest, but do not prove, that
those claims resolved before the official notification appear to have involved
clear-cut issues of negligence, but did not involve gross negligence. Descriptions
of incidents42 included general-liability issues, such as patients falling in the
hospital or equipment failures; issues with hospital management, such as long
wait times; and billing issues, such as a hospital charging for resuscitation when
patient had a current DNR order.43
One of the principle areas of concern with medical care is rates of
misdiagnoses. Approximately twenty percent of claims involved some allegation

42. Descriptions of claims and allegations have been redacted to remove identifying information
and to protect the identities of the patients and providers.
43. Tracking System, supra note 22.
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of an issue with a diagnosis.44 Claims involving a misdiagnosis were less likely to
result in payment,45 but the average size of the payment for claims with an
allegation of misdiagnosis was higher than the average payment for claims
without an allegation of misdiagnosis.46
Table 5 shows that claims resolved before the official notification of a claim
were clustered, in terms of severity, with the largest number (by far) grouped in
severity levels 2 through 4, and with an additional group of resolutions involving
severity level 9—that is, medical incidents that led to death of the patient.
Table 5: Severity Level of Claims Resolved Before the Pre-suit Period
Severity
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Resolved Claims Before
Pre-Suit Period
39
75
267
94
48
18
18
7
78

Total Resolved
Claims
3,178
3,614
10,654
6,192
8,353
6,571
3,443
2,558
16,932

Percent of Total Resolved
Claims
1%
2%
3%
2%
1%
0%
1%
0%
0%

The significant increase in the number of cases resolved before the official
notification of a malpractice claim is interesting; but at present, there is no clear
explanation for the finding. Insurers and medical providers may simply be
settling smaller claims as soon as the incident occurs. Perhaps the internal
reporting mechanisms in hospitals and other medical providers have triggers
allowing for the quick payment of malpractice claims when fault is clear but the
severity and consequent settlement amount is small. Early settlement avoids
legal transaction costs for the liability insurer, possibly requiring minimal
involvement of lawyers. Alternatively, it may be that the movement towards
apologies for healthcare errors is finding root in Florida, allowing for earlier
settlements. Finally, in 2004, Florida enacted legislation summarized as a “three
strikes” law—healthcare providers who are found negligent or admit negligence
three times lose their professional licenses. Perhaps this is motivating healthcare

44. The Florida closed-claims database includes a “misdiagnosis” category, which provides a
verbatim account of the alleged misdiagnosis. Id. These data were transformed into binary variables,
where “1” represented any allegation of misdiagnosis and “0” was an absence of misdiagnosis. All data
were hand-coded by the authors.
45. The rate of payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was 95.5%, compared to
87.2% for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is statistically significant to the 0.001 level.
46. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $90,114, compared
to $93,752 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is not statistically significant.
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providers to settle smaller claims before the initiation of a lawsuit, to avoid
getting a “strike.”47
B. Resolutions Occurring During the Official Pre-suit Period
The next profile is of claims resolved during the official ninety-day pre-suit
period. Recall that in Florida, after filing a claim, plaintiffs must wait ninety
days before filing a lawsuit.48 During this time, the defendant must conduct a
review of the incident in question.49 After this internal review, the defendant can
reject the claim, make a settlement offer, or move that the claim be handled
through arbitration.50 In addition, during this period, both the plaintiff and
defendant may engage in informal discovery, with the important qualification
that any information gained is not admissible in a formal lawsuit if the claim
does go forward.51 In recent years, the number of claims resolved during the presuit period increased, peaking in 2002 for resolutions and 2004 for dispositions
(see Figure 4 below).

47. The proposed constitutional amendment was passed by voters in 2004, and is now in the
Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 26. The measure, however, was understandably
controversial and resulted in some legislative retooling that rendered it less effective in practice. See
Laura J. Spencer, The Florida “Three Strikes Rule” for Medical Malpractice Claims: Using a Clear and
Convincing Evidence Standard To Tighten the Strike Zone for Physician Licensure Revocation, 28 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 317, 320 (2008) (describing the scheme established by the amendment as
“controversial”); Mary Coombs, How Not To Do Medical Malpractice Reform: A Florida Case Study,
18 HEALTH MATRIX 373, 393–94 nn.88–90 (2008) (discussing the “three strikes” law amendment);
Carol Gentry, Court Asked to Revive “3 Strikes,” HEALTH NEWS FLA., Sept. 10, 2010, available at
http://www.healthnewsflorida.org/index.cfm/go/public.articleView/article/13838 (discussing criticisms of
the enacted amendment); Melissa Morgan Hawkins, Amendments 7 and 8 Update: Legislation Enabling
the Patients’ Right to Know Act and Three Strikes Rule, 24 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7, 9 (2006) (discussing the
effect of the subsequent legislative enactments enabling the amendment).
48. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (2010).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 766.106(3)(b).
51. Id. § 766.106(5).
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Figure 4: Claims Resolved in the Official Pre-suit Period

Overall, claims resolved in the pre-suit period were reported in just under a
year (342 days) and disposed of in 1.87 years (684 days), which is shorter than
the overall average, but obviously longer than those cases settled before the
pre-suit period. The average indemnity paid during the official pre-suit period
was $194,227, which is higher than the payments in claims settled before formal
notification ($90,867) and the overall average indemnity paid ($129,620). Just
over eighty percent of claims resolved in the pre-suit period resulted in a
payment to the plaintiff. If only the paid claims are considered, the average
indemnity payment rose to $252,085, a figure that is under the overall average
of $302,495 for all paid claims.
There are quite a few similarities to the overall patterns of severity levels for
claims resolved before the pre-suit period. In particular, the majority of pre-suit
settlements were in the lower ranges of severity (levels 1 through 4), suggesting
the defendant or the defendant’s insurer may have recognized that resolving the
claim would result in smaller payments and litigation expenses than defending
the claim.
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Table 6: Severity Level of Claims Resolved in the Official Pre-suit Period
Severity
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Resolved Claims During
Pre-Suit Period
306
565
1,368
780
760
465
268
214
1,329

Total Resolved
Claims
3,178
3,614
10,654
6,192
8,353
6,571
3,443
2,558
16,932

Percent of Total
Resolved Claims
10%
16%
13%
13%
9%
7%
8%
8%
8%

Claims resolved during this period often involved allegations of failures to
maintain the standard of care during the provision of medical treatment,
including misdiagnoses; issues during surgery; the improper administration of
drugs or anesthesia; and issues involving infants, birthing, and delivery.52 The
overall rate of allegations of misdiagnoses remained in the low twenties (at
22.4%), as with those claims resolved before the pre-suit period. The rate of
payment was lower for claims involving an allegation of a misdiagnosis,53 but
had no effect on the payment amounts.54 The data presented on claims resolved
during the official pre-suit period suggest that, for many claims, the regulatory
requirement of an investigation by the defendant’s insurer produced the desired
effect: the resolution of claims outside the formal litigation system. Compared
to those claims resolved before this period, these claims had a higher severity
level overall and resulted in higher payments. These claims also appear to have
been more complex, particularly in the determination of a failure to maintain
the standard of care or to assess blame, than claims resolved before this period.
C. Claims Resolved Through Arbitration
An examination of the claims resolved through arbitration revealed several
interesting patterns. As discussed, all Florida medical-malpractice claims are
bound to a mediation process unless they are resolved before a lawsuit.55 In
addition, before, during, or after mediation the claim can be submitted for
arbitration solely for the determination of damages, with the defendant

52. Tracking System, supra note 22.
53. The rate of payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was 84.2%, compared to
68.9% for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is statistically significant to the 0.0001 level
using a standard difference-of-means test.
54. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $193,890, compared
to $238,117 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is not statistically significant using a
standard difference-of-means test.
55. FLA. STAT. § 766.108(1) (2010).
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admitting fault.56 Figure 5 graphically displays the number of claims resolved
through arbitration by occurrence and disposition year, as well as the total
number of claims. As the figure shows, claims resolved through arbitration
peaked in 1996 and again in 2004. The earlier peak does not mirror a general
increase in the overall number of claims (see Figure 1).57
Figure 5: Claims Resolved Through Arbitration

Examining the time to reporting and disposition for arbitration claims,
however, reveals that claims resolved through arbitration were resolved in a
much shorter time than would be expected.58 Recall that for claims overall, it
took 3.25 years from occurrence to disposition. In contrast, claims resolved
through arbitration only required 717 days, or 1.96 years, for final disposition.59
The next set of data involves the average payments for claims resolved
through arbitration. Recall that the average indemnity paid for all medicalmalpractice claims from 1990 to 2008 (in 2008 dollars) was $129,620. In contrast,
claims resolved through arbitration had an average payment of $219,673, or
approximately $80,000 more than the average payment overall. In addition,
although 64% of all the claims resulted in payment, over 86% of claims
resolved through arbitration resulted in payment, which produced higher

56. Id. § 766.106(3)(b)(3).
57. See supra Part IV.A (discussing an increase in claims corresponding with an increase in the
Florida population).
58. Keep in mind that the later years of data (from approximately 2006 onward) should be treated
with caution due to the likelihood that many claims had not yet been reported or closed at the time of
data collection.
59. The time from occurrence to disposition took an average 717 days, with a minimum of sixteen
days and a maximum of 4,102 days. From occurrence to reporting, the average claim resolved through
arbitration takes just under one year (333 days), with a minimum of zero days and a maximum of 3,591
days.
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overall indemnity payments. In comparison to the average of $302,476 for all
claims, the average payment for resolution through arbitration was $249,901.
This finding is not very surprising given the higher number of low-severity
claims resolved through arbitration and the process by which claims were
submitted for arbitration, as claims may be submitted to arbitration for the
determination of damages if the defendant has admitted fault.
As Table 7 reports, there was a great deal of variation in the severity of
claims resolved through arbitration. The most frequent severity levels were
level 360 and level 9.61
Table 7: Severity Levels of Claims Resolved Through Arbitration
Severity
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Resolved Claims Through
Arbitration
92
66
422
291
179
88
71
65
400

Total Resolved
Claims62
3,178
3,614
10,654
6,192
8,353
6,571
3,443
2,558
16,932

Percent of Total
Resolved Claims
3%
2%
4%
5%
2%
1%
2%
3%
2%

Examining the distribution of the severity levels of claims resolved through
arbitration in the context of the overall number of claims reveals a slightly
different picture. Column four of Table 7 presents the percentage of each
severity level resolved through arbitration. Arbitration resolved more cases on
the lower end of the severity scale, representing four percent of level 3 resolved
cases and five percent of level 4 resolved cases.
Claims resolved through arbitration often involved issues of monitoring and
diagnosis in the alleged suffering of the patient and in the seriousness of
allegations against the medical providers.63 The 20% of claims resolved through
arbitration involving an allegation of misdiagnosis had a lower rate of payment
(88.4% for claims without misdiagnosis, compared to 77.3% for claims with an
allegation of misdiagnosis), but a higher average payment.64 As indicated in

60. Temporary: Minor—Infections, mis-set fracture, fall in hospital. Recovery delayed. See supra
note 38 (providing the NAIC scale).
61. Permanent—Death. See id.
62. Here, both paid and unpaid claims are used, concentrating on those cases that have been
resolved.
63. Tracking System, supra note 22.
64. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $191,802, compared
to $315,208 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is statistically significant to the 0.01 level
using a standard difference-of-means test.
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Table 7, there was also an increase in the seriousness of the injuries to the
patients. In addition, the reports by the insurers and doctors revealed conflicts
over liability, damages, and the appropriate course of action. For example, one
claim involved an infant who went into septic shock after birth requiring belowthe-knee and partial upper-extremity amputations. This claim also involved a
conflict between the doctors and defense counsel, who both believed the case
defensible, and the liability insurer, who paid a pre-suit settlement to “protect
the insured from any potential excess verdict.”65
Claims resolved through arbitration were often incredibly complex and
frequently involved the patient losing trust in the medical provider. It may be
that arbitration can resolve these claims because the parties have to engage in a
structured discussion and negotiation.
D. Settlements Made Before or During the Mandatory Settlement Conference
Next, consider claims settled before or during the mandatory settlement
conference.66 By this point in the claiming process, the plaintiff and defendant
have gone through a mandatory waiting period and the plaintiff has formally
filed a suit for medical malpractice. The defendant has gone through an internal
review, had an opportunity (during the pre-suit period) to make an offer of
settlement or arbitration to the plaintiff, both sides have engaged in formal
discovery, and the opportunity for the defendant to offer arbitration has
remained available. Claims that reach this point were harder to resolve; thus,
the payment rate declined but the size of payments increased compared to
earlier stages in the resolution process. As displayed in Figure 6, the number of
settled claims peaked in 2000 and 2001 for incidents, and 2004 and 2005 for
dispositions, and then declined.

65. As with all claims described in the paper, this claim is redacted to protect the identities of both
the patient and providers.
66. See FLA. STAT. § 766.108(2)(a)–(b) (2010) (requiring all parties in medical malpractice claims
to attend “a settlement conference at least 3 weeks before the date set for trial”). Generally,
“[a]ttorneys who will conduct the trial, parties, and persons with authority to settle shall attend the
settlement conference held before the court unless excused by the court for good cause.” Id.
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Figure 6: Claims Resolved Before or During the Mandatory Settlement
Conference

The downward slope in incidents of settled claims could be explained by the
dramatically longer time from incident to disposition for claims in this stage as
compared to claims resolved before the pre-suit period, during the pre-suit
period, or during arbitration. The time from incident to disposition for claims
settled during the mandatory settlement conference averaged 1,473 days (over 4
years).67 As such, the incident data in the later years presented above may
represent a dramatic underestimation of the number of settled cases. The
average payment pattern for settled cases ($251,094) was higher than the overall
average, as well as in comparison to claims resolved before or in the pre-suit
period or through arbitration. The 81.5% of settled claims that were paid had
an average indemnity of $309,762, which was again higher than the overall
average ($302,495), and the average payment for paid cases resolved at earlier
stages.
An additional difference—beyond the time between the incident and the
disposition—between cases settled at this stage and those resolved earlier was
the severity of the cases. As Table 8 below shows, there were much-larger
numbers of higher-severity cases settled and a much-lower distribution of cases
in severity levels 1 through 4.

67. This metric was not introduced in profiling other stages of resolution as there were no suits
filed in many of the cases resolved prior to the mandatory settlement conference. Thus, such a figure
would be meaningless. At this stage of resolution, however, there is a requirement of a suit for a
mandatory settlement conference, so the amount of time from occurrence to suit is meaningful.
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Table 8: Severity Level of Claims Resolved Before or During the
Mandatory Settlement Conference
Severity
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Resolved Claims Before
or During the Mandatory
Settlement Conference
505
478
2,558
1,652
3,247
2,418
1,447
1,011
6,850

Total Resolved
Claims
3,178
3,614
10,654
6,192
8,353
6,571
3,443
2,558
16,932

Percent of Total
Resolved Claims
16%
13%
24%
27%
39%
37%
42%
40%
40%

The prose summaries of claims reveal a high number of level 9 claims
involving death. Examining claims resolved before or during the mandatory
settlement conference, there was an increase in claims involving allegations of
misdiagnoses, with a third of claims (thirty-three percent) involving issues of
misdiagnoses. The claims involving misdiagnoses continued to result in lower
payment rates,68 but misdiagnoses had no effect on the size of the average
payment.69
E. Resolutions During the Trial, After the Verdict, or After Appeal
The final set of analyses involves those cases that settled after the trial
begins, during the trial, after the verdict, during the appeal, or after the appeal.
Parties settle claims at this stage to avoid a trial judgment, avoid an appeal, or
avoid the ramifications of a verdict at either the trial or appellate level. A very
low number of claims were settled at this stage. As Figure 7 shows, the number
of claims settled after the trial began peaked in 2000 and 2001.

68. The rate of payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was 82.3%, compared to
79.3% for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is statistically significant to the 0.001 level
using a standard difference-of-means test.
69. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $250,591, compared
to $257,366 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is not statistically significant.
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Figure 7. Claims Resolved During the Trial, After the Verdict, or During
Appeal

As with claims settled during the mandatory settlement conference, these
claims had a much-longer lifespan from incident to disposition, namely an
average of five years (1,866 days). Generally, the long time-lag between
disposition and resolution is a result of delays between reporting and
disposition. Overall, these claims had a much-higher indemnity payment, paying
$361,364 on average, or a full $230,000 above the average overall payment.
These claims, however, were also much less likely to result in payment; only
forty-four percent resulted in payment. As a result, the average indemnity paid
for these claims was quite high at $883,420—a full $500,000 above the average
overall payment for all paid claims.
Similar to the claims settled before or during the mandatory settlement
conference (see Table 8 above), the claims settled after the beginning of the
trial were more likely to occupy the higher ranges of severity. Taking this
pattern into account, the distribution of these claims was fairly even among
severity levels, as demonstrated by Table 9 below.
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Table 9: Severity Level of Claims Resolved During the Trial, After the
Verdict, or During Appeal
Severity
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Resolved Claims During the
Trial, After the Verdict, or
During Appeal
31
48
190
146
298
250
147
79
600

Total Resolved
Claims
3,178
3,614
10,654
6,192
8,353
6,571
3,443
2,558
16,932

Percent of Total
Resolved Claims
1%
1%
2%
2%
4%
4%
4%
3%
4%

The small number of claims resolved during the trial process were more
likely to involve an allegation of misdiagnosis—thirty-eight percent of these
claims involved some type of misdiagnosis allegation. The misdiagnosis
allegation, however, had no effect on the rate of payment70 and it did not change
the average payment.71 Claims resolved during the trial involved a high number
of issues surrounding births and infant health, as well as an increase in the
severity of injuries resulting from strict-liability conduct or misdiagnoses.72
VIII
PREDICTING THE PRESENCE AND AMOUNT OF PAYMENT
The data suggest that the stage of resolution increased the probability of a
payment from the defendant to the plaintiff. Applying a logistical-regression
model to these data can demonstrate the effect of each stage on the probability
of payment, using claims resolved during the settlement period as the baseline.73
The logistic model in Table 10 reveals several interesting results. First, resolving
a claim before the pre-suit period showed the largest positively substantive
effect on the probability that a claim would result in payment, whereas
resolution during or after a trial had a negative effect. Arbitration and
resolution during the pre-suit period had near equal effects on the probability
of payment.

70. The rate of payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was 44.6%, compared to
42.1% for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is statistically significant to the 0.001 level.
71. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $356,790, compared
to $435,479 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is not statistically significant.
72. Tracking System, supra note 22.
73. The settlement period is used as the baseline because it is the period when the most claims are
resolved. Using it as the baseline allows for a comparison to the most likely scenario.
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Table 10: Effect of Stage of Resolution on Probability of Payment
Variable
Before Pre-suit Period

Odds Ratio74
(Standard Error)75
2.696**
(0.165)

Pre-suit Period

1.268**
(0.0405)

Arbitration

1.661**
(0.0810)

During or After Trial

-0.867**
(0.0575)

Misdiagnosis

0.0334
(0.0279)

Severity

0.104**
(0.00479)

Number of Days Between Incident and Disposition

Constant
N
Pseudo R² 76

0.000227**
(0.0000186)
-0.504**
(0.0372)
32,056
0.584

+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Looking at a variety of control variables, Table 10 supports a finding that
the presence of a misdiagnosis allegation slightly increased the probability of
payment. The higher the claim’s severity, the higher the likelihood of payment;
whereas the longer the claim took to be resolved, the lower the likelihood of
payment. None of these control variables, however, came close to having a
similarly substantive effect on the likelihood of payment as resolution before

74. The odds ratio column gives the amount of change expected in the odds ratio when there is a
one unit change in the predictor variable, with all of the other variables in the model held constant. An
odds ratio close to 1.0 suggests that there is no change due to the predictor variable.
75. The standard error for the odds ratio is obtained from the logistic regression coefficient and its
standard error using the formula: se(odds ratio) = exp(coef.)*se(coef.).
76. Using dichotomous data (such as data presented here, in terms of the probability of payment)
necessitates the use of logistic regression, where an equivalent statistic to R-squared does not exist. As
such, an equivalent figure is calculated using McFadden’s R-squared. See JEREMY FREESE & J. SCOTT
LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA 109 (2d ed.
2006) (discussing McFadden’s R-squared).
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the pre-suit period, during the pre-suit period, or through arbitration. The
stage-of-resolution, presence-of-misdiagnosis, severity-of-injury, and time-toresolution variables explained more than half of the variance in whether a claim
resulted in a payment.77
Examining the same set of variables on the amount of payment revealed
equally interesting patterns.
Table 11: Effect of Stage of Resolution on Payment Amount for Paid Claims
Variable
Before Pre-suit Period

Coefficient78
(Standard Error)79
-14,780.5
(29,910.2)

Pre-suit Period

55,144.9**
(12,140.0)

Arbitration

66,618.8**
(20,981.5)

During or After Trial

177,032.8**
(20,650.9)

Misdiagnosis

Severity

Number of Days Between Incident and Disposition

Constant
N
R²

14,965.1
(9,450.8)
37,725.5**
(1,617.0)
7.541
(6.264)
-53,700.8**
(12,810.0)
31,968
0.021

+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
The results presented in Table 11 demonstrate that there was no difference
in the amount of payment for resolved claims before the pre-suit stage
compared to resolution through a settlement conference (which is the most
77. The pseudo R², which measures the goodness of the model’s fit, was just over 0.58 for these
variables.
78. The coefficient is the value for the regression equation for predicting the effect of the
dependent variable from the independent variable.
79. The standard error is used for testing whether the parameter is significantly different from 0 by
dividing the parameter estimate by the standard error to obtain a statistically significant value.
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common resolution stage). Resolution during the pre-suit period, through
arbitration, or during or after the trial led to increased payments. The length of
time to disposition and the presence of an allegation of a misdiagnosis did not
affect the size of payments, whereas severity had a positive effect (both
statistically and substantially) on the size of the payment.
Taken together, the results presented in Tables 10 and 11 suggest that the
resolution stages were not merely markers of the inevitable progression of a
claim from incident to disposition. Instead, each resolution stage presented a
different opportunity to resolve the claim. The specific mechanisms set forth in
these stages, such as the discovery component in the pre-suit stage, or the
defendant’s ability to admit fault and submit to arbitration on damages in the
arbitration stage, allowed for new opportunities for resolution. It should be
noted that the variance explained by the stage of resolution, misdiagnosis,
severity, and time to disposition explains a great more of the variance in the
probability of resolution than the payment amount. This simply suggests that
the stage of resolution has a larger causal effect on the probability of payment
than the size of payment.
IX
MEGA AWARDS AND STAGES OF RESOLUTION
It is important to investigate the nature of medical-malpractice claims that
lead to very large payments because these are often the claims identified as
evidence of the medical-malpractice “crisis.” Figure 8 reports the number of
million-dollar cases by incident and disposition year. The number of milliondollar claims peaked in 1996 and in 2003 and 2004. Keep in mind, however,
even in the peak years, the sheer number of claims with payments exceeding a
million dollars was low as compared to the total number of claims resulting in
some payment.
Figure 8: Million-Dollar Claims
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On average, the settlements took just over a year (395 days) to be reported
and 3.6 years to be disposed (1,325 days).
Not surprisingly, the majority of claims with million-dollar payments
involved higher-severity injuries; in fact, million-dollar claims made up more
than ten percent of level 7 claims and thirteen percent of level 8 claims. The
correlation between higher severity levels and higher payments is expected;
logically, injuries that are more serious generated greater costs.
Table 12: Severity Level of Claims Resulting in Payments of One Million
Dollars or More
Severity
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Resolved Claims Resulting in
Payments of One Million
Dollars or More
19
9
37
39
74
176
329
332
509

Total Resolved
Claims
3,178
3,614
10,654
6,192
8,353
6,571
3,443
2,558
16,932

Percent of Total
Resolved Claims
1%
0%
0%
1%
1%
3%
10%
13%
3%

There are interesting patterns in the resolution stages of million-dollar plus
awards. Although million-dollar payments can occur at any stage of the
resolution process, the vast majority (sixty-eight percent) of these “mega
awards” were agreed to before or during the mandatory settlement conference.
Table 13 demonstrates that the million-dollar payments resolved before the
official pre-suit period or through arbitration had a significantly lower
maximum payment, suggesting that using arbitration to settle disputes—even
large disputes—or engaging in pre-claim offers coincided with the less severe of
the large claims. The high number of claims resolved through the mandatory
settlement conference suggests that high-value claims benefit from
institutionalized ADR requirements.
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Table 13: Million-Dollar Claims, Stage of Resolution, and Summary
Statistics
Time to
Reporting
(days)

Time to
Disposition
(days)

Average
Indemnity
Paid

Maximum
Indemnity
Paid

Claims

Modal
Severity

Pre-claim

12

9

150

586

$1,631,036

$3,055,250

Official Pre-suit
Period

199

9

308

732

$2,553,098

$42,400,000

Arbitration

82

9

342

844

$2,303,231

$16,300,000

Mandatory
Settlement Period

998

9

407

1401

$2,063,796

$50,100,000

After Trial

165

9

450

1981

$2,754,318

$34,200,000

Claims that resulted in a payout of a million dollars or more had rates of
misdiagnoses (thirty-four percent) that were similar to claims resolved during
the mandatory settlement period. The average payment did not differ greatly
between those claims involving misdiagnoses and those without an allegation of
misdiagnosis.80 Million-dollar claims involved a wide variety of issues, including
severe medical issues that were inappropriately allowed to escalate to
untreatable levels; issues with wrongful births, pregnancies, and labor; and
accusations of unnecessary surgeries or treatments.81 The vast majority of
million-dollar payouts occurred following deaths or very severe, life-altering
injuries.
X
CONCLUSIONS
The profile of the settlements of Florida medical-malpractice claims
included in this article provides a structure with which any proposals for ADR
must contend. The findings do not provide an argument against ADR. Medicalmalpractice disputes are painful for patients and medical providers. Any new
way of resolving claims in a more expeditious and less adversarial way should
be strongly encouraged.
At the same time, proponents of alternative resolution mechanisms must
take into account two important lessons: First, causality and negligence are
frequently unclear at the beginning of the claims process. Investigation, and
often formal discovery, is required to identify the issues around which the claim
is made. Frequently, the facts are ambiguous and contestable, especially at the
beginning of the dispute. Second, statutes, court rules, and case law provide a
structure intended to facilitate resolution as efficiently as possible, without
resorting to a trial. The data presented in this article suggest that a variety of
resolution mechanismspre-suit discovery, optional arbitration, and pre-suit
80. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $2,327,079,
compared to $2,286,743 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is not statistically significant.
81. Tracking System, supra note 22.
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settlement conferencesprovide new opportunities for the parties in a medicalmalpractice case to resolve their claims.
The data show that many claims are closed without payment to the claimant.
Informal investigation or formal discovery may reveal that medical negligence
did not occur—at least in a legal sense—or that the costs of pursuing the claim
were likely to be high in comparison to the probable amount of recovered
damages. Nevertheless, in these instances, mediation or some other form of
ADR might provide a sense of “healing” or “closure” for the plaintiff–patient
and perhaps for the defendant–medical provider. Those claims that do result in
payment are often closed relatively early. Indeed, the majority of settlements,
regardless of the payment size, never reach the stage of a formal trial.
The analyses in this article have underplayed the potential role of mediation
in the settlement process simply because the closed-claim files do not report
mediation outcomes. Yet mediation must play some role in the settlement
process because of the Florida statute requiring mediation within 120 days for
all claims resulting in the formal filing of a lawsuit.82 Further research to uncover
the influence of mediation on the eventual settlements would benefit our
understanding of the resolution process. Often, mediation does not result in an
immediate settlement; but the exchange of information during the session
allows parties to examine the other side’s viewpoint. There are generally no
clear rules to the content of mediation: It may focus merely on an exchange of
information, or it may serve as a forum for venting feelings as well as
exchanging information. Most ADR discussion emphasizes the palliative effect
of emotional expression. In fact, mediation sessions of medical-malpractice
cases in North Carolina fit more closely with the information-exchange model
than the emotional-venting model. The lawyers are in control and make formal
presentations through PowerPoint and “day in the life” films. Even when the
plaintiff and defendant are present, they may not participate directly in the
session. This is in direct contrast to the assumed emotional-venting and healing
goals of many ADR proposals.83 More research is needed on the subject of
mandatory mediation, including the effects of different mediation models on
the perceived legitimacy of the outcome and the palliative effects on the
participants. In any event, mediation should be viewed as a possible silent factor
in the stages and outcomes described in this article: the extent of its role in
settlements is unclear, including its role in the many instances in which plaintiffs
abandon claims, or its effect on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of plaintiffs
and defendants.
By providing clear profiles for the types of claims resolved through a variety
of mechanisms and stages, this research contributes several important lessons to
the study of ADR and medical malpractice. First, providing a variety of pretrial

82. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
83. This is based on the personal observations of Professor Vidmar, who has observed medicalmalpractice mediations in North Carolina.
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mechanisms for resolution allows a diversity of parties to resolve their claims.
Second, regulatory mechanisms that provide an incentive for discussion (like
mediation and arbitration) or discovery (like Florida’s pre-suit period) produce
a variety of results, in terms of the type of claims that are resolved, the
likelihood of payment, and the size of payment. Third, not all ADR
mechanisms are equal, in terms of the number of claims that will be resolved
through the method or in terms of the results produced through those
resolutions. Advocates of ADR should carefully consider the usefulness of a
resolution mechanism to both the plaintiff and the defendant before arguing for
its implementation.

